Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size, the evolutionary process can select any strict Nash equilibrium if the probability of choosing a nonbest response is statedependent. This paper shows that the unique selection of the risk dominant equilibrium is robust with respect to state dependent mutation in local interaction games. More precisely, for any given mutation structure there exists a minimum population size beyond which the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. Our result is driven by contagion and cohesion among players, which exist only in local interaction settings and favor the risk dominant strategy. Our result strengthens the equilibrium selection result of evolutionary game theory.
1 Introduction Kandori et al. (1993) and Yo u n g (1993) show that when the risk dominant equilibrium does not coincide with the payoffdominant equilibrium, the former is uniquely selected over the latter for global interaction games with mutation under the bestresponse dynamics. When a group of agents plays a given coordination game and there is a small mutation probability that each agent may choose a strategy that is not a best response, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected uniquely as the probability of mutation vanishes to zero. Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the result depends crucially on the mutation parameters. In particular the equilibrium selection result may be overturned and the payoffdominant equilibrium selected if state dependent mutations are allowed and the ratio of the mutation probabilities becomes unbounded as the mutation probabilities approach zero. If agents are more cautious, make fewer mistakes or experiment less when playing the payoffdominant action than the risk dominant action, then playing the payoffdominant action remains the long-run equilibrium.
This paper reexamines the argument of Bergin and Lipman for equilibrium selection in the context of local interaction games i.e., games where each player interacts only with a subset of the population called neighbors. We show that for a given mutation structure there exists a minimum finite population size such that for a population size above this level, the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. This result is driven by a specific feature of local interaction games: equilibrium selection depends on the size of the population. Bergin and Lipman do not analyze the effect of population size because equilibrium selection is independent of the population size in global interaction games [see the motivating example in Bergin and Lipman (1996) ].
The nature of our result is easiest to understand in a model where agents play against their nearest neighbors on a circle of size N, as in Ellison's 1993 example. Assume that the probability of an agent not playing its best reply is smaller when playing the payoffdominant action than when playing the risk dominant action. Note that if there are two adjacent players playing the risk dominant action, they continue to play it independent of the strategy profile played in the remainder of the circle. Moreover the local interaction environment means that one particular strategy can spread gradually through the population from one neighborhood to the next i.e., it allows for contagion. This works deterministically in one dimension because the neighbors of the two players mentioned above simply switch to the risk dominant action in the next period in the absence of mutation. Thus, transition from the configuration of playing the payoffdominant strategy everywhere to that of playing the risk dominant strategy everywhere takes at most 2 mutations. In contrast, transition from the configuration of playing the risk dominant strategy everywhere to that of playing the payoffdominant strategy everywhere requires N simultaneous mutations because of cohesion among players playing the risk dominant strategy. Hence the number of mutations required to make a transition to the state of playing the risk dominant strategy everywhere is independent of the population size while the transition to the state of playing the payoffdominant strategy everywhere depends on the population size. Therefore, if the population is big enough, the latter transition probability can be made much smaller than the former if the mutation structure across the two strategies is taken as fixed.
More generally, we demonstrate the above result in an environment where players are located on a two dimensional torus and they interact with their nearest neighbors. We have chosen this structure for two reasons. First, this relatively simple setup shares some fundamental features with more general local environments: it allows for cohesive groups formed by players located close to each other, and, in contrast to the one dimensional case, it makes contagion a stochastic phenomenon. Thus, it requires a non-trivial generalization of the one dimensional argument. Secondly, this environment is the simplest one that allows us to apply some useful tools to study local interaction environments. We explore the general idea of renormalization based on cohesion and characterize the evolution of play in terms of connected islands of players playing the same strategy.
The basic mechanism that characterizes local interaction environments is the presence of contagion. This mechanism can be fairly trivial and deterministicfor instance, in the one dimensional setup where contagion spreads even from two consecutively located agents. It is not always true, however, that contagion spreads deterministically. To see this point, consider a two dimensional large torus and suppose that all agents on a square of side length 2 play the risk dominant strategy. It is easy to see that if no mutations occur, these agent continue to play the risk dominant strategy regardless of the strategy profile in the remainder of the torus. Hence the square plays a similar role to the 2 adjacent agents playing the risk dominant strategy on the circle. The risk dominant strategy does not spread, however, beyond the square in the absence of an additional agent playing it next to the square. We need further mutations to induce contagion, which is a stochastic event. Hence we consider the analysis as an exercise about the interaction of contagion dynamics and mutation dynamics.
To simplify the analysis we rely on two ideas. The first is renormalization, which makes use of the following observations. If all members of a group play the risk dominant strategy and these players never abandon it without mutation, then we say that the environment allows for cohesive groups. The smallest such group is called a team. It is easy to see that a team is a four player square in the case of the two dimensional torus with nearest neighbor interaction. If all these four players play the risk dominant strategy, then each of them will have at least two neighbors playing the risk dominant strategy. This is because each member of the four player team has two neighbors who themselves are members of the same team. Therefore all four players' best response is to play again the risk dominant strategy in the next period. It follows that if we want to show that the whole population eventually adopts the risk dominant strategy, then it is sufficient to show that the population of four player teams adopts it. If we rescale the torus so that the rescaled unit corresponds to two units of the original torus, then each location on the rescaled torus corresponds to four players on the original one. We can define a stochastic process on the new torus that can track the stochastic process on the original one. The switch from players to teams is called renormalization and the new process is called renormalized process. The advantage of the renormalized process is that four player teams playing the risk dominant strategy never disappear unless their members mutate. Thus, the set of teams playing the risk dominant strategy can only grow over time without mutation, but cannot shrink.
Our second idea deals with the problem of having a large and complicated state space. For a torus of size N, the number of states is 2 N . The following argument enables us to simplify the analysis of this large state space. Note that each configuration contains a (possibly empty) connected island of teams playing the risk dominant strategy. We show that the transition from one state to another depends crucially on the size of such an island contained in the configuration. More precisely, in a two dimensional environment we need only to know the size of a square of teams playing the risk dominant strategy contained in a configuration to estimate the transition probabilities to the other states. The intuitive reason is the following: small squares of four player teams playing the risk dominant strategy can disappear with few mutations. In contrast, large squares are more difficult to break because the required number of mutations is proportional to their size. Therefore, the size of the square is pivotal in determining the transition to another state. In particular, we show that once the process reached a state that contains a square of a critical size where all teams in the square play the risk dominant strategy, that square exhibits a strong growth property. Thus, contagion makes it very likely that it grows further, ensuring convergence to the risk dominant equilibrium.
It should be noted that our result holds for any state dependent mutation structure if we let the population size approach infinity first, and then we allow the mutation probabilities to go to zero. The intuition for taking the limits in this order is the same as outlined in Binmore et al. (1995) : the model is intended to capture long run behavior under small but non-vanishing noise.
1 Relatedly, Binmore et al. (1995) also argue that taking the limit of the mutation probabilities first and of the population size second can yield dynamics that approximate a noiseless rather than a small noise environment, which is not what we are interested in. Our main interest is what happens under small noise: and we find that in large populations the risk dominant equilibrium is much more likely to be selected, even if mutations are state dependent.
A number of recent papers analyze local interaction games. For instance Anderlini and Ianni (1996) , Bala and Goyal (1998) , Blume (1993 Blume ( , 1994 Blume ( , 1995 , Ely (2002) , Lee and Va l e n t i ny i (2000) and Morris (2000) examine the issue of equilibrium selection in local interaction games with and without mutation. However, none of these papers addresses the issue of robustness of equilibrium selection to state dependent mutations. Our idea about how to analyze the complicated state space is related to Ellison (2000) . He develops a powerful technique for the determination of the long-run distribution of a stochastic process when there are many limit states in the system. This technique can be applied also in local interacting settings. He focuses on how the system evolves step-by-step from one limit set to the next. In a similar spirit, we focus on how the system evolves from one configuration containing a large connected island of players playing the risk dominant strategy to the next similar configuration. However, it is not clear from Ellison's argument why step-by-step evolution should favor the selection of the risk dominant equilibrium. Our paper demonstrates why the dynamics of the local interaction model favor the selection of risk-dominant equilibrium.
Closest to our current work is Lee and Va l e n t i ny i (2000) . In their paper strategies are randomly assigned to players initially, and subsequently players play deterministic best response dynamics without making any mistakes. This environment can be viewed as one where all the mutations take place at time zero in the form of random assignments of the initial strategies to the players. It is clear that coordination on the risk dominant strategy can occur only if the initial state generated by the random assignment lies in the basin of attraction of the state in which everybody plays the risk dominant strategy. In this case the contagion mechanism can ensure coordination without the interference of mutation. Lee and Va l e n t i ny i (2000) show that if the risk dominant strategy is played with positive likelihood initially, then the probability of the event that the realization of the initial state lies in the basin of attraction of the risk dominant strategy approaches one as the population size increases.
The important difference between their paper and ours is that Lee and Va l e n t i ny i (2000) separate mutation and contagion in time; our paper on the other hand focuses on their dynamic interaction. The current paper shows that the interaction between (state dependent) mutation and contagion fundamentally changes the population dynamics. If randomness plays a role only initially, then the population dynamics are characterized by transitions through various transient states before hitting the limit state where everybody plays the risk dominant strategy. In contrast, if contagion interacts with mutations over time, then for small mutation probabilities, the population spends most of the time in intermediate limit states of the mutationless process, i.e., in states from which the population cannot escape without mutations, before coordinating on the risk dominant equilibrium. The difficulty lies in showing that the interaction of (state dependent) mutations and the contagion dynamics pushes the state out of these intermediate limit sets in a manner that ultimately favors the risk dominant equilibrium. The arguments of Lee and Va l e n t i ny i (2000) do not really help to clarify this point. Their result shows that states that are not in the basin of attraction of the risk dominant equilibrium, including intermediate limit states, are relatively rare. The dynamics considered in this paper spend most of the time in limit sets, which are accordingly not considered in the other paper.
After Bergin and Lipman's 1996 suggestion of a careful examination of the implications of state dependent mutation, more attention has been paid to the issue. For instance van Damme and Weibull (2002) examine the decision making process when there are costs of making mistakes. They conclude that the introduction of state dependent mutations does not overturn the standard equilibrium selection result, since players' concern about the cost of mistakes favors mutation toward the risk dominant strategy. Similarly, Yo u n g (1998) investigates whether one can relax the uniformity of mutation in a plausible way without changing the stochastically stable outcome. Although considering the consequence of various additional factors in the decision making process is an important issue, we believe that it is at least as important to prove the robustness of the equilibrium selection result for a certain environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a 2-dimensional environment of local interaction. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper. This section starts with a renormalization argument, then characterizes the stochastically stable outcome using a series of lemmas and propositions. Section 4 concludes the paper and the appendix contains the proofs of 3 technical lemmas.
Local Interaction Game

A framework of local interaction
There is a population of N 2 players located on a 2-dimensional torus Λ(N) = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} 2 (mod N) for N≥1. A player with address x ∈Λ(N) interacts with her nearest neighbors. The set of neighbors for the origin is defined by N≡{ y : y = 1} where y ≡(|y 1 | + |y 2 |), and the set of neighbors for player x is given by x + N≡{ y : x − y = 1}, namely the translation of N by x.
There are two actions {A, B}; and pure strategies s t :Λ(N) −→ {A, B}. We characterize the population at time t in terms of the set of players playing A, thus
(1)
Coordination game
Consider the 2 × 2 coordination game given in Table 1 . We require that a > c, d > b and (a − c)≥(d − b) so that both (A, A) and (B, B) are Nash equilibria and (A, A) is the risk dominant one.
All players play the game simultaneously over discrete periods and infinite horizon. The feature of local interaction is reflected in that the payoffof each player
Table 1: Coordination Game depends on the strategy played by herself and everyone in the neighborhood. The payoffof player x playing strategy A in period t is given by
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. Similarly, the payoffof player x playing strategy B in period t is given by
In the absence of mutation, players are assumed to play the myopic best-response: player x in period t + 1 chooses
Thus player x plays A in period t + 1 if
Since (A, A) is the risk dominant equilibrium, θ<1/2. This describes the dynamics of the model without mutations.
State Dependent Mutation
We introduce mutation into the model: the agent may make a mistake or an experiment and thus chooses a strategy at random with a small probability. In particular we consider a stochastic process {S ε t } t≥0 which is derived from {S t } t≥0 , allowing for randomness due to mutation. In the configuration of the noise structure, we recognize explicitly the possibility of state dependent mutation probabilities.
Let ε > 0 be such that ε α(A) + ε α(B) ∈ [0, 1] for some α(A),α(B) > 0. Moreover, define {λ t (x)} x∈Λ(N) for all t as a collection of independent random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and define X t (x) as:
Thus, agent x in state S t mutates to A in period t + 1 if X t (x) = A; mutates to B if X t (x) = B; and does not mutate otherwise. Also note that {X t (x)} x∈Λ(N) is a collection of random variables for each t that are independent across players and time. The specification also ensures that the mutation probability depends on the state of the player.
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Using the construction, the transition rule for the process {S ε t } t≥0 can be formally written as
(6) This construction defines a Markov-chain S ε t . Denoting the event where everybody plays A by A, we are interested in the long-run probability of the event A:
which is the same as the probability of A under the invariant distribution of S ε t . In particular our main goal is to characterize µ ε (A) as ε ↓ 0.
Best Response Dynamics with State Dependent Mutations
Our analysis of the long-run distribution of the population consists of two steps. First, we construct a new process which satisfies a sample path inequality with respect to the original process; the sample path inequality then implies a certain distributional inequality. 3 Secondly, we characterize the long-run distribution for the new process and deduce the properties of the limiting distribution of the original process using the distributional inequality. The main benefit of the stepwise approach is the analytical convenience the new process provides.
Renormalization and Coupling Argument
Suppose that N is even. 4 Let Λ(M) be a torus where M≡N/2, and assign to each y ∈Λ(M) a set of four players from the original torus Λ(N) by
We call y and x ∈ H(y) a team and a team member, respectively. Note that the definition establishes a one to one correspondence between a specific location Λ(M) and a set of four locations on Λ(N). This will allow us to track the evolution of the population of players using the evolution of teams. We shall also refer to the population of teams as the renormalized population. Let z t :Λ(M) −→ {A, B} be a map which represents the state of team y at time t, which will be defined shortly. As before, we characterize the dynamics of the population in terms of the set of teams playing A, thus Z ε t = {y : z t (y) = A}. We construct an initial configuration Z ε 0 , and a transition rule such that if the state of a team is A, then all of its team members play A in the original population. 
where
Note that {x ∈ H(y) :
Thus, the set of agents belonging to teams playing A in the initial period is a subset of the set of agents playing A in the original population. Secondly, we construct the transition rule for the renormalized process without mutation such that the condition {x ∈ H(y) : y ∈ Z t } ⊂ S t (if a team plays A, then all of its members in the original population play A) is satisfied for all t≥0. Observe that if all members of a team play A in the original population, then the best response for all team members is A regardless of the behavior of all other players. Therefore, if a team plays A, it will never adopt B in the absence of mutation. Moreover, let
where e 1 = (1, 0) e 2 = (0, 1).
That is, G i (y) represents the two teams adjacent to y in coordinate direction i. It is easy to see that if a team playing B encounters two other teams all of whose members are playing A in two different coordinate directions, then all members of the team adopt A in at most 3 periods under the original process without mutations (see Figure 1 where the reference to time indicates the period when the agent adopts A).
For future reference we summarize the transition rule for the renormalized process in the absence of mutation by the following lemma. Thirdly, we construct a random variable representing mutations for the renormalized population using the random variable representing mutations for the origi- Figure 1 : Propagation mechanism for the teams with no mutation
• agents playing A in period t nal population. Let Y t (y) be a random variable with values
y) and n = 3t − 2, 3t − 1, 3t, and X 3t (x) A B otherwise.
(12) In words {Y t (y) = A} is the event in which all team members mutate to A in period 3t, {Y t (y) = 0} is the event that no mutation to B occurred during the periods 3t − 2, 3t − 1, 3t, and we are not in the previous case. Finally, {Y t (y) = B} is the event that at least one team member mutates to B during the periods 3t − 2, 3t − 1, 3t, and not all team members mutate to A in period 3t.
There are two important facts about Y t (y). First, the construction of Y t (y) and Lemma 1 ensure that the stochastic process for the renormalized population is a Markov process. Secondly, the timing for the renormalized population is different from that of the original population. As we can see on Figure 1 , it takes three periods under the original process for all team members to adopt A. Therefore the clock for the renormalized population ticks slower: three periods under the original process correspond to one period under the renormalized one. This is reflected by the timing convention used in the definition of the random variable Y t (y).
Moreover, a team mutates to B with probability at most 12ε α(B) . For small ε there is a¯α(B) such that this probability is at most ε¯α (B) i.e.,
Finally, after the construction of the transition rule without mutations, and defining the random variable representing mutations for the teams, we can construct the transition rule for the renormalized process with mutation
Equation (14) can be decomposed to three transition mechanisms: contagion, cohesion, and mutation. Contagion is represented by the first bracket. If team y is playing B at time t, and meets two other teams playing A in two different coordinate directions, it chooses A at time t + 1. Since we require that neither team y nor any of the two other teams mutate at time t + 1, the construction in (12) implies that no members of any of these three teams mutated in the original process at 3t + 1, 3t + 2, 3t + 3. Therefore, all members of team y make a transition from B to A during 3t + 1, 3t + 2, 3t + 3. Consequently, all players in these three teams plays A at time 3t + 3 in the original process. Cohesion is captured by the second bracket. It indicates that a team playing A continues with the same choice in the absence of mutation. Since Y t+1 (y) = 0 implies that no member of team y mutates during 3t + 1, 3t + 2, 3t + 3, all members of team y play A at time 3t + 3 in the original process. Mutation is represented by the last bracket. Again, the construction of mutation for teams ensures that if team y mutates to A at time t + 1, so do all team members at time 3t + 3 in the original process. All three mechanisms are inherited from the original population; renormalization makes cohesion explicit and simplifies the way contagion works. The above decomposition also highlights the analytical advantage of working with the renormalized process rather then the original one. Transition from B to A can take place both in the presence and the absence of mutation in the original process. In contrast, transition from A to B takes place only as a consequence of mutation in the renormalized process. This simplifies the derivation of the limit distribution of the renormalized process.
It follows from our discussion above that our construction ensures the desired relationship between the original and renormalized process as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 1
The process {Z ε t } t≥0 governed by the transition rule (14) and starting from the initial condition (9) satisfies
for all t.
Proposition 1 in turn has an important consequence for our analysis captured by the following statement. Let ν ε (A) be the long run probability of the event where all teams play A.
Corollary 1 If lim ε→0 ν ε (A) = 1, then lim ε→0 µ ε (A) = 1.
Proof. It suffices to prove that µ ε dominates ν ε , i.e. ν ε (A)≤µ ε ( A). This follows from equation (15) i.e., the event that Z ε ∞ =Λ(M) implies the event that S ε ∞ =Λ(N).
Contagion versus State Dependent Mutation
This subsection presents the main result of the paper. Our main goal is to demonstrate that for any state dependent mutation structure, contagion dominates mutation: given the mutation structure, the risk dominant equilibrium will be uniquely selected in the long run for a sufficiently large but finite population. The proof is built around two important concepts.
Definition 1 (Lock-in) A state Z is called a lock-in if no team changes strategy in the absence of mutation. The set of these states is denoted by L.
If strategy A does not spread further through contagion, then the state is a lock-in.
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The next concept is new.
Definition 2 (k-restricted lock-in) Draw an M × M square representation of the torus. Denote the "left-upper" k × k square by R(k). We call a state the restriction of Z to R(k) if all teams inside R(k) play a strategy according to Z while all teams outside R(k) play B. If the restriction of Z to R(k) is a lock-in, then Z is called a k-restricted lock-in. The set of k-restricted lock-ins is denoted by L k .
Put differently, we treat all teams outside R(k) as if they played B. If no team ever adopts A inside R(k) due to contagion, then Z ∈ L k . The definition describes the set of states where the configuration outside R(k) does not generate contagion 7 i.e., there are no contagious effects coming from outside R(k). It is easy to see that a k-restricted lock-in is also an l-restricted lock-in for all l < k. Although a restricted lock-in is not necessarily a lock-in, any lock-in Z is a k-restricted lock-in for all k < M.
We start by proving a preparatory lemma. We characterize the lock-ins in terms of the minimum number of teams playing B. We do the same for the k-restricted lock-ins. The first result is very useful when we need to know the minimum number of mutations required to leave the basin of attraction of a lock-in and to make a transition to another lock-in with fewer teams playing A. The second result is very useful when we want to make a similar statement for k-restricted lock-in with all teams in R(k) playing A.
First, we introduce some notations. Let L A k be the set of k-restricted lock-ins with all teams in R(k) playing A. Moreover, let Z k be the set of configurations where at least k teams in
Proof. Consider the statement for lock-ins. Observe that it is sufficient for the whole population to adopt A in the absence of mutation if at least M teams play A at t = 0 and these teams are located on a diagonal [see the illustration in Figure 2a • agents playing A in period t
It is easy to see that all teams next to the diagonal have two neighbors in two different coordinate directions playing A. Therefore these teams adopt A by lemma 1. Applying induction, we obtain that all teams adopt A at t = M − 1. Next, suppose that at most M − 1 teams play B initially. To see that such a configuration cannot be a lock-in, note that a torus of size M × M can be viewed as an object consisting of M parallel diagonals of length M. If at most M − 1 teams play B at t = 0, there must be at least one diagonal on the torus on which all teams play A. Hence our previous argument implies that the whole population adopts A which proves the first part of our lemma. Now consider the statement for k-restricted lock-ins. Since a k-restricted lockin is not a torus but a square which cannot be viewed as an object consisting of parallel diagonals, the previous argument cannot be applied directly. However, a redefinition of the concept "diagonal" for squares solves our problem. View R(k) as consisting of an upper and a lower triangle plus the main diagonal. Pick up a diagonal of length n 1 from the upper triangle and the corresponding diagonal of length n 2 = k − n 1 from the lower triangle. Let a "diagonal" be defined by these two pieces. The k − 1 such "diagonals" plus the main diagonal give us k "diagonals." Elementary argument shows that if any of the constructed diagonals contains k teams playing A, all teams in R(k) eventually adopt A in the absence of mutation [see the illustration in Figure 2b ]. Therefore our previous argument applies proving the second part of the lemma.
After this preparation, we shall characterize the limit distribution of the process {Z ε t } using a result on first passage times. First, we introduce some notation. Let T Z = inf{t > 0 : Z ε t = Z} be the first passage time to state Z. For Z ⊂Λ(M), define T Z = inf Z∈Z T Z as the first passage time to a set of states Z. For an event E, let
We use the following well-known identity for ergodic Markov-processes to characterize the long run distribution [see Durrett (1996, Chapter 5) ]:
To show that for a given mutation structure, A is played most of the time in a sufficiently large but finite population as ε ↓ 0, we look for an appropriate upper bound in +terms of ε on the above ratio. We estimate the numerator and denominator separately. The key is to estimate the latter. Before presenting the formal proof of our claim, we discuss our argument informally. Since lock-ins are stable in the absence of mutations, it is sufficient to focus on how the population dynamics makes the transition from one lock-in to another. To find an upper bound on the ratio in (16) requires to find an upper bound on the nominator and a lower bound on the denominator. It turns out that the probability of leaving A and arriving to a lock-in with the lowest number of teams playing B before hitting A again gives us a sufficiently tight bound on the nominator. It is easy to see that the mutations towards B have to remove at least an entire column or row of teams playing A to get out of the basin of attraction of A. This probability is of order O(ε¯α (B)M ). To find a lower bound on the denominator is more difficult because there is no simple event whose probability would provide a sufficiently tight bound. To find such a tight bound, we focus on the dynamics starting from a configuration that contains an R(k) square of players playing A. Such an initial condition is useful because irrespective of what happens outside R(k), players inside R(k) keep playing A in the absence of mutations. We characterize the dynamics of the population in terms of the growth of the initial square from R(k) to R(k + 1) for k = k 0 , . . . , M − 1. This will give us a lower bound on number teams playing A in any time period. The heart of our argument is the assessment of the outcome of a "race" between the opposing forces shaping R(k). On the one hand, the event that a team outside R(k) located diagonally at one of the corners of R(k) mutates to A and that this is followed by a sufficiently long period without mutations will favor the expansion of R(k) to R(k + 1). It is easy to see that A will spread from R(k) to R(k + 1) due to contagion when this event occurs. On the other hand, too many mutations to B inside R(k) favor the destruction of R(k) and the adoption of B if the cohesion effect is not strong enough. Which one of the two forces does win the race? Intuitively, the outcome of the race should depend on the size of the square. If the square is too small, then cohesion is weak and few mutations towards B can destroy R(k) before it grows to R(k+1) with the help of contagion. However, if R(k) is large then cohesion is strong enough to resist mutations, and it gives a chance for R(k) to expand. Consequently, there must be a critical size m such that if the population starts from all teams playing A in R(m) then the outcome of the "race"favors the expansion of R(k) by positive probability over its contraction. Therefore the denominator is bounded from below by the probability that the initial square of critical size is created, which turns out to be O(ε¯α (A)m ). Comparing the two bounds it becomes clear that given α(A) and¯α(B) the population coordinates on A for sufficiently high M. Now we turn to the proof for the main theorem which is constructed via three lemmas. Although they are somewhat technical, we believe that there is a clear intuition behind each of these lemmas. The first lemma establishes the order of the probability of getting from one lock-in to another one which has "fewer teams" playing A. We provide the proofs of the following 3 lemmas in the appendix since they are technical.
Lemma 3 Let Z and Z be two lock-ins with Z Z . The probability of getting from lock-in Z to lock-in Z without hitting any other lock-in is given by
Proof. See the Appendix. Note that any configuration with fewer then M teams playing B (other then A) is not a lock-in by Lemma 2. Therefore this lemma also implies that if the process starts from A, the probability that it hits any configuration with at least M teams playing B before getting back to A is bounded from above by Kε¯α (A)M . The next lemma formulates a "local" version of this observation. In words, the lemma says that the probability of leaving a configuration which contains a k × k square of teams playing A and hitting a state where the k × k square has at least a row or column of players playing B before returning to a configuration containing a k×k square of teams playing A is bounded by some constant multiple of ε¯α (B)k . This local version of the previous lemma will make it possible to track the evolution of the process more closely and in the end prove our main claim.
Proof. See the Appendix. The next lemma builds on the previous two lemmas to provide the key to the proof of our main claim.
where . is the ceiling function (the next integer up if¯α(A)/¯α(B) is not an integer). Fo r all M > m, 1
for any Z ∈ L − A.
Proof. See the Appendix. This is the lemma that assess the outcome of the "race" we discussed previously: the next diagonal team needs to mutates to A before too many teams at wrong locations inside R(k) mutate to B. The probability of the event that the next diagonal team mutates to A at each occasion when all teams play A inside R(k) is ε¯α (A) . The probability of the event that the process hits a k-restricted lock-in with positive number of teams playing B in R(k) is at most Kε¯α (B)k . The fact that the ratio of these two probabilities is bounded from below by a constant for k≥m implies that the set of teams playing A has a strong growth property for small ε. Intuitively, m acts as a "critical mass" in the argument; once the teams in R(m) play A, the critical mass has been reached and it is easy to proceed.
The next theorem states our main result.
where m is defined in equation (19).
Proof. We prove our claim in two steps. The first step focuses on Z ∈ L− A whereas the second step considers Z L.
Step 1. Consider the states Z ∈ L − A. We have that
Since Z is a lock-in and Z A, Z has at least M teams playing B. It follows from Lemma 3 that
Indeed, starting from A, the first lock-in on the way requires at least M mutations to B. Moreover, the previous lemma implies
for M≥m. Putting these together yields
In particular, for M≥m 2 , ν ε (Z)
Step 2. Consider the states Z L. LetˆZ be the state to which Z converges in the absence of mutations. Then
The denominator is of order 1, because if no mutation occurs for the next M 2 periods (which happens with probability approaching 1) then we hitˆZ without hitting Z for sure. The numerator goes to zero as ε → 0. Indeed, a mutation is required in the first step, otherwise we would stay atˆZ. The aforementioned condition guarantees that all mutation probabilities tend to zero.
Therefore
as ε → 0. This holds true forˆZ = A as well as other lock-ins. All in all we have that ν ε (Z)
for any Z such that Z A. The proof is complete.
Putting together this result and Proposition 1 yields that for N≥2M even, the only long-run stochastically stable set of the original {S ε t } t≥0 process is A. It remains to consider the situation when N is odd. Let N = 2M + 1. Consider a 2M × 2M rectangle on the torus. Note that throughout the proofs so far we have not used the fact that the environment is a torus, and not an M × M square. Thus the theorem is applicable for the 2M × 2M square on the torus. Note that if all teams in the 2M × 2M square are playing A, then contagion in the absence of mutation implies that the (2M + 1)st column and row will also play A in a finite time period. Since mutation probabilities go to zero, we can conclude that A is the only longrun stochastically stable set of the game for N = 2M + 1 too. Thus the following corollary holds.
Corollary 2 Fo r N≥2m
2 we have
where m is defined in (19), and µ ε is the unique invariant distribution of S ε t .
Conclusion
We have shown that adding small mutation probabilities to a local interaction model of evolution leads to the selection of the risk dominant equilibrium in the long run despite the state dependence of the mutation probabilities. This is in contrast with results on global interaction games. Considering the fact that the situations captured by the approach are mainly social phenomena involving many loosely-related agents, the local interaction framework could be a better description of the reality than the global interaction framework. Therefore our result justifies the approach of evolutionary game theory that deliberately avoids a detailed analyzes of the nature of the mutation process. Our argument might be extended to more general settings with a higher dimension, a larger interaction range and many strategies. If our intuition is to be extended to a different local interaction environment, the environment has to meet two conditions. First, it should allow for cohesive groups based on the risk dominant strategy. This makes the risk dominant strategy more resistant to mutations relative to the payoffdominant strategy. Secondly, the environment should be sufficiently connected that contagion can propagate the risk dominant strategy through the whole population.
We know from Blume (1995) , one can construct cohesive teams for more general interaction ranges. Since contagion works in a similar way in Blume's environment, the main idea of our proof could be applied. Furthermore, in a higher dimensional environment teams (hypercubes of the corresponding dimension) can also be constructed, and the arguments of Schonmann (1992) imply that the contagion mechanism works in the same way. Finally, if we consider many strategies when there is a unique strategy A that is a best response to any configuration where at least half of the opponents play A, then stable teams can be constructed, and our proof can be applied. However, to prove our result for these environment would not be a trivial exercise.
We can also draw some conclusions about the relationship between mutation and contagion in a more general local interaction environment than the torus; see Morris (2000) and Yo u n g (1998, Chapter 6). The existence of cohesive groups and the contagion mechanism is essential for our argument to work. If both cohesion and contagion favor the risk dominant strategy, then the intuition behind our result implies that the number of mutations required to eliminate a large group playing the risk dominant strategy will depend on the size of the group. In contrast, to propagate the risk dominant strategy through contagion requires few mutations, independent of the population size. This asymmetry may ensure that results on state-dependent mutations similar to ours could be obtained in a more general spatial environment. 
Proof of Lemma 5
We construct an event which is a subset of the event {T A < T Z }, and estimate its probability from below. The key step of the proof is to show that, for all k≥m, if all teams in R(k) play A, there is a positive probability independent of ε that all teams in R(k + 1) will play A before returning to Z. Thus m plays the role of a critical mass: once a sufficiently large set of teams (measured by m) play A, it is easy to proceed. So the difficulty lies in reaching this critical mass of m, and hence the bound ε¯α (A)m . Since Z ∈ L − A, it follows from lemma 2 that state Z contains at least M teams playing B. Draw an M × M square representation of the torus such that the uppermost and leftmost team plays B in Z. Denote the "left upper" k × k square in this M × M torus by R(k), and the set of diagonal elements by D(k). Observe that this construction ensures that at least the uppermost and leftmost team in R(k), k = m, . . . , M, plays B. Consequently, Z ∈ L k − L A k for all k = m, . . . , M which implies by lemma 2 that Z ∈ Z k for all k = m, . . . , M.
To estimate Pr Z T A < T Z from below, consider the following inequality:
To see why this inequality holds, first note that L A M = A. Next observe that the first term is the probability that the process visits an m-restricted lock-in where all teams in R(m) play A before getting back to Z. The second term is the product of probabilities. Each term in this product measures the probability that the process passes from a k-restricted lock-in to a k + 1-restricted lock-in without hitting Z k . Along such a path the process does not hit Z because Z ∈ Z k for all k = m, . . . , M. Since this chain of events is sufficient but not necessary for T A < T Z to occur, its probability is a lower bound on Pr Z T A < T Z . Thus the inequality indeed holds.
We now turn to estimate each term on the right hand side of the above inequality separately. We shall complete this estimation in two steps.
Step 1. Suppose that at least the teams in D(m) mutate to A in the initial period and no mutations to B take place during the next m periods. Lemma 1 implies that all teams in R(m) play A after at most m periods, and we have not returned to Z. Thus for some K 1 > 0 and ε small.
Step 2. We prove now that the probability of getting from L A k to L A k+1 without hitting Z k is bounded from below by a constant independently of ε. To find this bound we recycle our construction of the shadow process from the previous lemma to construct an event that is a subset of T L A k+1 < T Z k .
Let˜T i Z be the ith hitting times of the shadow process Z k,ε t on some subset Z of the M × M representation of the torus. Consider the following inequality: The right hand side captures the following event. The shadow process starting from L A k returns to L A k several times without hitting Z k . One of these times the next team along the diagonal mutates to A. Finally, no mutation takes place for the next k + 1 periods after that. We can write the probability of this joint event in a product form because of the Markov property and because the shadow process is independent of what mutations take place outside R(k) in Z ε t (and of course D(k+1)/D(k) is outside R(k)).
If this joint event happens, then all teams in R(k) play A in Z ε t and Z ε t did not hit Z k on the way because Z k,ε t ⊂ Z ε t by construction. Since the next team along the diagonal mutated to A, and no mutations happened afterwards for k + 1 periods, contagion drove all teams in R(k + 1) to play A in the end. Therefore the probability of this joint event is indeed a lower bound for the left-hand side.
We estimate each term on the right hand side separately. The strong Markov property of the stopping times˜T i L A k , i = 1, 2, . . . and Lemma 4 imply for the first event on the right hand side that
where we use the fact that¯α(A)≤¯α(B)k for all k≥m by construction. The second term is equal to 1 − ε¯α (A) i−1 ε¯α (A) . Finally, the probability of the third term i.e., that no team mutates to B for k + 1 periods is bounded from below by 1 − ε¯α
.
